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In this paper I will argue in favor of the view that if physics is to become a coherent 
metaphysics of nature, it needs an interpretation, namely (i) a clear formulation of its 
ontological/metaphysical claims and (ii) and a precise understanding of how such claims are 
related to the world of our experience, which is the most important reservoir of traditional, 
merely aprioristic metaphysical speculations.  
 
1. AN ATTEMPT AT CLASSIFYING POSSIBLE ATTITUDES 
 
In order to argue defend this claim, I will begin by quoting some interesting remarks of 
Robert DiSalle’s Understanding Spacetime, where we find an historically grounded 
discussion about possible ways of characterizing the relationship between physics and 
metaphysics (DiSalle 2006, pp. 57-60). Some of his remarks will be very helpful not only as a 
starting point to survey possible ways to characterize such a relationship in contemporary 
philosophy of physics, but also to understand, to a certain extent, the historical development 
of this relationship, and also some future directions that it might take.  
A first position that Di Salle does not discuss and that is, however, too important and 
widespread to be neglected claims that physics and metaphysics are to be regarded as 
completely independent of each other, so that they cannot conflict even in principle. This 
position amounts to a reciprocal attitude that − when it does not amount to disrespect − could 
be labelled Tolerance. “Tolerance” means that the subject matter of the disciplines is to be 
regarded by their practitioners as completely non-overlapping, so that neither of the two 
disciplines can claim to offer a more reliable description of the fundamental structure of 
reality. This stance is widespread among a significant number of contemporary philosophers 
or metaphysicians, who pursue their work without paying any attention whatsoever to what 
happens in the field of science, or physics in particular. Perhaps more significantly, this 
attitude is also advocated by the vast majority of physicists, who − unconscious disciples of 
early neopositivism − are convinced that physics has nothing to do with metaphysics. Physics 
is, and ought to remain, immune from metaphysics: possibly, the only metaphysical 
hypothesis that is needed by physics is, as Dirac used to say at the beginning of his lectures, 
that there exists an external world. 
A second option consists in the attempt to subordinate one discipline to the other. 
“Subordination”, in its turn, here might mean two different things, as argued by DiSalle (ibid. 
p. 57). On the hypothesis that physics and metaphysics both try to offer a description of 
reality and could give conflicting claims about it, one could either claim that either physics or 
metaphysics is closer to the truth than the other − either on single questions or in general − or 
try to derive the principles of one discipline from those of the other. Let us distinguish 
between these two attitudes, by naming the former Denial and the latter Explanatory 
Imperialism. Denial and Explanatory Imperialism have been exercised much more on the part 
of philosophers over physics, than in the opposite direction. This asymmetry might depend on 
the sociological fact that in the last two centuries science has acquired much more prestige 
with respect to traditional metaphysics. Consequently, while physicists often implicitly 
believe that they can afford to ignore what happens in the field of metaphysics since they are 
tracking the truth, the converse does not hold. Metaphysicians feel that they have to justify 
they own approach to things even if many of their beloved concepts (space, time, matter, 
number, motion etc.) have become the subject matter of science. 
The historical figures of Descartes and − to a lesser extent that of Leibniz − represent the 
first clear example of Denial, namely the attempt to claim that metaphysics is closer to truth 
than physics (see also DiSalle, p.57). The reader will recall that Galileo was accused by 
Descartes of lacking a systematic method in his approach to natural philosophy, and of being 
too absorbed by scattered and isolated empirical questions. On the other hand, Newton’s 
physical hypotheses were attacked by Leibniz on the basis of metaphysical and theological 
principles (the Identity of the Indiscernibles, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason applied to 
God’s choice). Notably, in contemporary metaphysics this attitude of Denial seems lost: even 
those who tamper with Special Relativity for purely metaphysical reasons (see Craig 2001), 
do not deny the fact that the scientific theory they consider has some claim to (approximate) 
truth; in the example at hand, they simply supplement it with an unobservable reference frame 
which, as such, does not contradict the theory, but only its spirit (see Dorato 2001).  
The third possibility, Explanatory Imperialism, also grants metaphysics some sort of 
superiority over physics, and according to DiSalle is exemplified by the great mathematician 
Euler and by the early Kant. By granting «the possibility that the principles of physics may be 
taken at face value», and need not be rejected in the name of metaphysics, such a third view 
still assigns metaphysics the task to understand why those physical principles hold (ibid.). In 
other words metaphysics has the task to explain the basic principle of physics, by deriving 
them from deeper aprioristic, metaphysical truths. Also this third attitude, in contemporary 
metaphysics seems completely lost. Both Denial and Explanatory Imperialism seem two 
attempts at resisting a fundamental change in ways of acquiring knowledge about reality: 
from aprioristic analysis to empirical inquiry supplemented by mathematical models.  
Interestingly, the mature Kant realised that after Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica traditional metaphysics had no future. Transcendentalism or 
Foundationalism is the attempt to using philosophy or the theory of knowledge to inquire into 
the very possibility of physics (and metaphysics), namely to dig out those apriori structures of 
the transcendental subject that make physics (and mathematics) possible. In a nutshell, 
according to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Newtonian physics is a fact, and his theory of 
knowledge explains why it holds necessarily and universally, against the doubts raised by 
Humean scepticism with respect to the universal validity of physical laws. Contemporary 
neokantians give up the idea that our apriori categories grant universality and necessity to 
physics, but still retain the Reichenbachian view that some historically changing structure 
might be constitutive of important physical theories (Friedman 2001). 
According to DiSalle, this kind of kantian Foundationalism is to be interpreted at the same 
time as an inquiry into the right that physics has to address metaphysical questions (ibid.). 
This is why DiSalle, certainly by making some violence to Kant, also attributes him what for 
us should be regarded a distinct, fifth position, amounting to the claim that: «physics is not a 
consequence of the metaphysics of nature. Quite simply it is the metaphysics of nature. The 
metaphysical concepts that we find in physics − body, force, motion, space, time, become to 
us intelligible precisely, and only, as they are constructed by physics itself; physics provide us 
with the only intelligible notions we have on this matter» (ibid., p. 60).  
This fifth position, which we could call Physical Autonomy, is the claim that physics, being 
itself a metaphysics theory of nature, does not need any metaphysical analysis or intervention 
from outside. The reason why physics is a metaphysical theory of nature is given by the fact 
that it aspires to describe reality: as Einstein wrote to Schrödinger “the true difficulty lies in 
the fact that physics is a kind of metaphysics. Physics describes “reality”. But we don’t know 
what reality is unless we describe it with physics” (quoted from Allori, Dorato, Laudisa, 
Zanghì 2005, p. 13).  
Let us now pass to comment those options that are nowadays still regarded as alive, in 
particular Tolerance and Physical Autonomy. 
 
  2 TOLERANCE, DISTORTION AND THE COMPATIBILITY TEST WITH PHYSICS 
 
(2.1) Contemporary analytic metaphysic is replete with attempts at gaining some precise 
explications of notions like substance, event, persistence, object, sameness, identity, 
becoming, properties, disposition, causation, etc. All these investigations proceed, in many 
cases at least, in ways that are completely independent of what is taking place or has taken 
place within physics. For this reason, such investigations seem to belong to the kind of 
approach to metaphysics that I have named Tolerance. 
Are these researches relevant for a deeper understanding of physics? The answer seems to 
be in the negative, whenever these inquiries do not even feel the need to confront their 
theories with physics. This autonomous metaphysical theorizing is certainly interesting and 
worth-pursuing, but also containing contains the danger of sterility and isolation. Of course, I 
would not be ready to deny that, say, understanding the nature of causation, is important for 
its own sake; what is less clear, however, and still open to philosophical debate, is whether 
causation has any role in the object language of physics, rather than being important in a 
purely pragmatic or explanatory sense (see the debate between Norton 2009, claiming that 
physics does not need causation and Frisch 2009, trying to argue for the opposite claim). Here 
is how Norton put it in 2003: “Mature sciences, I maintain, are adequate to account for their 
realms without need of supplement by causal notions and principles.” The idea here is that in 
physics the notion of law replaces the notion of cause,1 even though the latter notion has still 
an important role in helping us to recover old, approximate theories from newer ones (say, 
Newton’s “cause” of free fall, invoking a force, from the contemporary geometrized theory of 
gravity).  
In conclusion, I would like to put forward the following claim: if it is not clear yet in what 
sense the notion of “property” or “cause” or “object” can affect, and play a role in physics, 
a confrontation with physics looks dubious or suspicious, and this is the main reason why 
many metaphysical inquiries within the analytic tradition remain, and possibly ought to 
remain, safely within the tradition of autonomy, with all the “dangers” that such an autonomy 
involves. 
(2.2) Another instance of tolerance, sometimes masked under the invitation to coming to 
terms with “real physics”, is what I could call “distortion”. This occurs when the 
confrontation with physics is only apparent, since the kind of physics that is invoked is either 
distorted or highly simplified. This sort of uses of a “non-actual physics” on the part of the 
analytic metaphysicians is what Ladyman and Ross criticize in various parts of their book, 
when they refer, for example, to the alleged “physically-based” opposition between atomism 
and “gunkism” (the view that matter is infinitely divisible): “ it is preposterous that in spite of 
the developments in the scientific understanding of matter that have occurred since 
[Descartes], contemporary metaphysicians continue to suppose that the dichotomy between 
[partless] atoms and gunk remains relevant, and that it can be addressed a priori” (Ladyman 
and Ross, 2007, p.20). This sort of appeal to an imagined physics really counts as an instance 
of Tolerance, especially if the method of inquiry continues to be wholly a priori.  
(2.3) One way in which a confrontation between metaphysics and physics really does 
occur, on the contrary, is when physical theories are invoked as a sort of experimenta crucis 
                                                 
1 For the relation between causation and law, see, among other texts, Dorato (2005) and Psillos (2002).  
to decide between two or more competing metaphysical views: if one of the metaphysical 
theories is in conflict with physics, it ought to be abandoned. An instance of this use of 
physics within the community of analytic metaphysicians is given for instance by the dispute 
between presentism and eternalism, namely between the view that only the present exists 
(presentism), and the view that past, present and future events exist on a par in a block 
universe (eternalism). 
Interestingly, there are people nowadays who claim that this dispute is not genuine (Dolev 
2006, Dorato 2006, Savitt 2006). But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that there is 
a genuine debate just in conceptual and metaphysical terms, and let us assume that this holds 
also for another debate with respect to which the special theory has been invoked as a decisive 
test, namely the problem between endurantists and perdurantists. I quote from an abstract of a 
recent article: “There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: 
endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have 
only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that 
objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of 
their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the 
persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity.” (Hales and Johnson 2003)). 
Clearly, the meta-philosophical principle, in both of these cases, is that if a metaphysical 
theory is not compatible with, or is not properly suited to adapt itself to, a physical theory, we 
should abandon it. However, note that also in these cases, the metaphysical debate is 
somewhat completely external to physics: the solutions to the question whether the future is 
real or not, or to the problem how entities persist, seem quite unrelated to what physicists 
nowadays are really after. These metaphysical problems, in other words, are external to, and 
independent of, the issues that are really debated within physics. This is why also this type of 
relationship between physics and metaphysics, I take it, fully belongs to the philosophical 




3 THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN PHYSICS AND THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION 
 
Taking stock from Einstein’s quotation above (“physics is a type of metaphysics”), or 
DiSalle (“physics is the metaphysics of nature”), I would like to sketch a view of the 
relationship between metaphysics and physics that regards the former as being strictly 
dependent on the latter. If the essential task of the philosopher of physics is interpreting 
physical theories − i.e., 1) coming up with a precise and exact ontology to associate to the 
language and formulas of physical theories and 2) relating such ontology to the world of our 
experience − it then seems that 1) necessarily involves a metaphysical task, namely finding 
out how the world can be like if our physical theories are at least approximately true. Note 
that this interpretation of the “interpretation of physics” (which has variously defended by van 
Fraassen 1980, Giere 1988 and Lange 2002) does not require truth from our physical theories, 
but can be embarked upon also by instrumentalists, since the whole interpretative task rests on 
a conditional statement (“if the theories are at least approximately true”). 
For instance, can the non-local correlations presupposed by entangled states be interpreted 
as referring to some sort of causal correlations? And if the answer is in the positive, which 
model of causation do they allow? When we ask such questions, it is of the utmost importance 
to remark that we can never exclude that one of the novelties of the whole worldview 
suggested by EPR-Bohm correlations lies just in the fact that no causal explanation is really 
fit to explain/interpret them, because these correlations are to be regarded as fundamental, or 
natural in Aristotle’s sense, and as such they need no causal explanation whatsoever (Fine 
1989). In other words, without taking stance in this complicated problem, here we simply 
want to suggest that sometimes the old, metaphysical notions (causation, property, 
dispositions) may be unfit to give an account of the new ontology suggested by a physical 
theory. In our example, this sort of possibility makes all attempts of looking for a causal 
interpretation of the correlations in question look outdated.  
The same could be true for the dispute between substantivalism and relationism, a 
metaphysical debate that might have been appropriate for the times of Leibniz and Newton, 
but simply inappropriate after General Relativity, which is a theory that overcomes the 
distinction between empty spacetime and matter by identifying spacetime with a gravitational 
field (Rynasiewicz 1996, Dorato 2008). In other words, the interpretative task must always be 
opened to the possibility that no current or traditional metaphysical category is really 
appropriate for the new physical theory, so that, one more time, the confrontation between 
metaphysics and physics is one between concepts and categories that are imposed onto the 
latter from the outside. 
As another example, consider the question: can the timelike-separation of events in 
classical spacetime theories be interpreted as giving rise to a tenseless form of local 
becoming? Philosophers who have recently defended this minimalist interpretation (Savitt 
2002, Dieks 2006 Dorato 2006b) are well aware that the question remains whether such a 
metaphysical reading of relativity is capable of connecting with, or explaining, the sense of 
passage of time typical of our experience. If this second explanatory task is not fulfilled by 
postulating a becoming of events defined as their timelike succession in the partial order 
defined by special relativity, the first ontological interpretation must be abandoned or at least 
corrected. This is why the ontological question posed by 1) − is relativity theory (special and 
general) interpretable as a theory that metaphysically admits of becoming? − can never be 
divorced from the questions raised by 2), namely the connection with our experience. 
In conclusion, I would like to stress that it is the connection of the metaphysical 
interpretation of a physical theory with our experience that gives us the final test for the 
plausibility of a proposed metaphysical interpretation. This is particularly evident in some 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, in particular in the no-collapse views linked to 
Everett’s interpretation. In a nutshell, Everett’s interpretation solves the measurement 
problem by denying the reality of the reduction process: the metaphysical interpretation here 
consists in claiming that the fundamental equation governing the temporal evolution of a 
quantum system is always linear and deterministic. Obviously, in this case one must solve two 
correlated problems, both involving an agreement with what we see, and therefore the 
relationship of the relevant metaphysical posit with our experience. The first problem is why 
we never perceive macroscopic superpositions. The second problem consists in trying to 
explain the origin of the notion of probability, namely the impression that the probabilities 
involved by the Born-rule play a fundamental role in quantum theory. The first problem is 
attacked with the theory of decoherence, which explains why we never perceive interferences 
(from within the same “world”) of Schrödinger’s infamous dead cat with its alive counterpart, 
even though all possible measurement outcomes do realize. This means that there is a world 
in which the cat is dead and looks dead, and a world in which the cat is alive, and looks alive, 
but in any of these two worlds macroscopic interferences are never observed, due to 
decoherence processes. In other words, the final state is still a macroscopic superposition of 
different “worlds”, even though this state cannot be accessible to our experience. Whether this 
interpretation is satisfactory is of course dependent also on how the second difficulty is 
tackled, a difficulty that recently has involved attempts at explaining the notion of probability 
in a physical theory with decision theoretic strategies of agents (Deutsch 1999, Wallace 
2007).  
The appropriateness of this interpretation of quantum mechanics of course cannot be 
judged in this context. Here it has been presented simply in order to show the reader how 
complicated the interpretation of a physical theory really is, and how far more promising a 
philosophical activity it is if compared with “external” metaphysical theorizing. The question 
of interpretation is in fact not external to physics at all, at least to the extent that in the past 
also physicists have asked themselves whether atoms or the ether existed or not; in any case 
the need to link the physical picture of reality with the world of our experience remains one of 
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